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This essay has two main claims about EPR’s Reality Criterion. First, we claim that the
application of the Reality Criterion makes an essential difference between the EPR argument
and Einstein’s later arguments against quantum mechanics. We show that while the EPR
argument, making use of the Reality Criterion, does derive that certain interpretations of
quantum mechanics are incomplete, Einstein’s later arguments, making no use of the Reality
Criterion, do not prove incompleteness, but rather point to the inadequacy of the Copenhagen
interpretation. We take this fact as an indication that the Reality Criterion is a crucial,
indispensable component of the incompleteness argument(s). The second claim is more
substantive. We argue that the Reality Criterion is a special case of the Common Cause
Principle. Finally, we relate this proposal to Tim Maudlin’s recent assertion that the Reality
Criterion is an analytic truth.
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1 Introduction
Here is how EPR famously formulate in their 1935 paper on the incompleteness of quantum
mechanics (QM) what has come to be known as the Reality Criterion (RC):
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e. with
probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an
element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity. (Einstein et al.,
1935, p. 777)
Purely looking at its wording, it is striking how general and deeply philosophical this criterion
is. It is a principle of apparent epistemological character that provides a way, as EPR put it,
of “recognizing a physical reality” (Einstein et al., 1935, p. 777). Whenever we are in a certain
epistemic position, of predicting the result of a measurement without influencing it, we had
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better adopt a certain ontology. In other words, the RC can be taken as a general inference
pattern from the epistemic to the ontic. In this respect it is on a par with Quine’s (1980) and
Putnam’s (1979) ideas about ontological commitment based on a successful scientific theory
(for one characteristic thing a successful theory provides is a means of predicting measurements
without influencing them).
On the other hand, it is remarkable that in the entire history and philosophy of physics—to
our knowledge at least—this general epistemological principle has been articulated and applied
only once, namely in the EPR argument. No mention of anything like the RC outside of the
specific context of the EPR problem in quantum mechanics. Moreover, it is worth observing that
the RC is completely lacking from Einstein’s later arguments on the incompleteness of quantum
mechanics, most of which were explicitly devoted to clarify what the EPR paper had actually
been meant to argue. As Fine (1996, p. 5) points out, while the RC plays a central role in the
original EPR text, these later arguments no longer make any reference to the criterion; they
simply eliminate it.
EPR regarded the RC as a “reasonable” principle which is “in agreement with classical as
well as quantum-mechanical ideas of reality” (Einstein et al., 1935, p. 777–778). It is not en-
tirely clear what Bohr’s position was towards the criterion itself, but perhaps it is grounded
in his positivistic views that he had doubts about its plausibility, as expressed in his response
to the EPR paper (Fine, 1996, p. 34–35). Refining Bohr’s subjectivist conception of quantum
theory, Quantum Bayesians have come to claim that the RC is an unwarranted principle (Fuchs,
Mermin, and Schack, 2014; Glick and Boge, 2019). Even without apparent philosophical com-
mitments, though, most physicists today would probably take it that the RC articulates the kind
of “classical realism” that can no longer be maintained in the quantum domain, as is conclusively
demonstrated by Bell’s theorem (Werner, 2014).
Others object. Tim Maudlin (2014) recently argued that the RC is not only a reasonable
principle but it is in fact an analytic truth; it is “just not the sort of thing that can coherently be
denied,” as he writes (Maudlin, 2014, p. 7). If there is anything wrong about the EPR argument,
or with “classical realism” in general, it is certainly not the RC to be blamed for it, Maudlin’s
claim suggests, simply because the criterion lacks any factual content.
Is then the RC a statement without any content? Might this be the reason for the lack of
attention to it in the general philosophy of science literature, as well as for the absence of the
criterion in later discussions of the EPR problem in Einstein’s own writings? Or, rather, does the
RC express a substantial philosophical commitment that can be reconsidered and reevaluated—in
particular, in light of the results of the EPR–Bell-type experiments? If so, how can Einstein so
easily dispense with it in his later reformulations of the EPR idea, while it is a crucial component
of the original formulation?
The aim of this paper is to answer these questions and clarify the meaning of the Criterion
of Reality. We believe that the RC articulates a general philosophical principle far from being
analytic that can be subject to reconsideration in light of the EPR–Bell problem in quantum
mechanics. We will support our view by the following two claims.
First, we will claim that the application of the RC makes an essential difference between the
EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments. We will show that while the EPR argument,
making use of the RC, does derive that certain interpretations of QM are incomplete, Einstein’s
later arguments, making no use of the RC, do not prove incompleteness, but rather point to the
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inadequacy of the Copenhagen interpretation of QM. This suggests that the RC is not eliminable
from the incompleteness argument(s)—at least from the one(s) we have so far laid out.
The second claim is more substantive. We will claim that the RC is a special case of the
Common Cause Principle.
We have to stress at the very outset that our discussion is not indented as a historical
analysis. Our primary interest is not what EPR and Einstein actually thought to argue or
what they themselves took the RC to be or what interpretation of QM they exactly had in
mind. Our analysis is meant to be a logical reconstruction of EPR’s and Einstein’s arguments,
providing a unitary conceptual framework—in terms of causally explaining correlations—to think
about these arguments, and to relate them to Bell’s treatment and contemporary discussion. To
set out such a reconstruction, we will need to sharpen, and to an extent revise, some of our
historically loaded terminology—such as what we mean by the Copenhagen interpretation or
completeness/incompleteness. In doing so, historical faithfulness and textual details will only be
relevant insofar as they provide evidence for the validity of the reconstructed arguments.
In the paper we will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we make a distinction between two
interpretations of the quantum formalism that will be crucial for our first claim. In Section 3,
4 and 5 we address the first claim, that is we compare the EPR argument with Einstein’s later
arguments. In Section 6 we turn to our second claim, namely that the RC is a special case of the
Common Cause Principle. In Section 7 we relate this proposal to Maudlin’s assertion that the
Reality Criterion is an analytic truth. We discuss the broader context of our results in Section 8.
2 Two interpretations of the quantum formalism
Consider the quantum mechanical description of an EPR–Bohm-type scenario, where a pair of
spin-12 particles is emitted by a source and detected at two remote places. The spin state space
of the two-particle system is Hilbert space C2 ⊗ C2. Suppose that the system is in the singlet
state Ψs = 1√2 (Ψ+v ⊗Ψ−v −Ψ−v ⊗Ψ+v), where Ψ+v,Ψ−v ∈ C
2 are the “up” and “down”
eigenvectors of the spin-component operator along an arbitrary direction v. Let a and b denote
the directions in which the spin of the left and right particle is considered, respectively. We
will only be concerned with the “spin up” events in these directions. Let Â and B̂ denote the
corresponding projectors on C2,
Â = |Ψ+a〉 〈Ψ+a| (1)
B̂ = |Ψ+b〉 〈Ψ+b| (2)
and Î denote the identity on C2. The quantum mechanical description yields the following values






















with θ being the angle between directions a and b.
Without further physical interpretation the quantum mechanical description is just a piece
of mathematics. The reason is that terms like “state,” “event,” “quantum probability,” while
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having precise mathematical definitions in the Hilbert space formalism, have no clear physical
meaning. For what we shall argue in the following, it will be crucial to distinguish between two
different physical interpretations of the formalism of QM. We describe these interpretations on
the example of the EPR–Bohm case.
The empirical content of QM is not a matter of interpretative choice. In testing the quantum
mechanical description of the EPR–Bohm scenario, quantum probabilities (3)–(4) are compared
with long run frequencies of outcomes of spin measurements, performed in an EPR–Bohm-type
experiment. If nothing more is assumed, we shall speak about the minimal interpretation of QM.
Minimal interpretation Consider the scheme of an EPR–Bohm-type experiment.
A large ensemble of two-particle systems is prepared “in the singlet state” by means
of a physical procedure Ps. In each run of the experiment a member of this ensemble
is analyzed: a particle pair is emitted, one particle flying to the left, the other one
to the right, and at remote places we measure the spin of the particles along cho-
sen directions. Let a and b denote the events of measuring spin along directions a
and b in the left and right wings of the experiment respectively. A and B denote
the corresponding “spin up” outcomes in the detectors on the two sides. Empirical
data are the relative frequencies of measurements a and b, and of the corresponding
“spin up” outcomes A and B, over the ensemble of runs—for varying measurement
directions a and b. On the basis of this observed statistics, one can calculate the
conditional probabilities of sort p(A|a ∧ Ps), p(B|b ∧ Ps), and p(A ∧ B|a ∧ b ∧ Ps),
defined by Bayes’s rule.1 The minimal interpretation consists in the identification




= p(A|a ∧ Ps) (5)〈
Ψs, Î ⊗ B̂Ψs
〉
= p(B|b ∧ Ps) (6)〈
Ψs, Â⊗ B̂Ψs
〉
= p(A ∧B|a ∧ b ∧ Ps) (7)
The minimal interpretation only talks about macroscopic measurement events and procedures; in
fact, any reference to “particles” or “quantum mechanical system” is dispensable. The quantum
mechanical state serves merely as an encryption of the statistics of these visible, macroscopic
events. It must be emphasized that since the empirical confirmation of QM is based on the
identification (5)–(7), all interpretations of the quantum formalism has to recover it, as long as
they are to restore the empirical content of the quantum mechanical description. This is the
sense in which the minimal interpretation is “minimal.” Different interpretations of the quantum
formalism may say different things about what lies behind the macroscopic measurement events;
of how “surface” statistics (5)–(7) actually come about.
Next we introduce such an interpretation and dub it Copenhagen interpretation. Since the
Copenhagen interpretation is not a monolitic doctrine but a reservoir of various views, we will
1This is not the place to enter into the well-known problem of how probability is precisely related to actual
relative frequency. For an overview of the various approaches to probability, see e.g. (Gillies, 2000). For a subtle
variant of actual frequentism, see (Hoefer, 2019).
2The idea that quantum probabilities are to be interpreted as classical conditional probabilities was first
formulated by (Szabó, 1995).
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specify this interpretation by five conditions. As we will see, these conditions will characterize
a Ψ-ontic collapse theory. We are not concerned here with the historical question whether such
a theory can be faithfully attributed to any of the members of the Copenhagen school. Bohr
himself did not seem to believe in the collapse since he attributed only a symbolic meaning to
the wave function. Von Neuman and Wigner, at the other end of the scale, thought that the
reduction is due to the human mind. Maybe the closest to the Ψ-ontic collapse theory presented
here was Heisenberg who was talking about the collapse as an objective physical process (Faye,
2019, Sec. 7–8). Be that as it may, we claim that it is the Ψ-ontic collapse theory characterized by
the following five conditions that was the target of Einstein’s later arguments against quantum
mechanics. We will see in Section 4 and 5 how each of the five conditions below is necessary to
derive the contradiction Einstein sets out to establish.
Copenhagen interpretation
(i) The quantum state not only describes the statistical behavior of an ensemble
of systems—encoding, for example, probabilities (5)–(7)—, but is conceived
as an element of reality pertaining to the individual system, characterizing
every individual member of the ensemble. To distinguish between the quantum
state as a mathematical object and the corresponding element of reality, we
introduce the following notations:
mathematical object element of reality
Ψs ψs
Ψ±v ψ±v
Ψ±a ⊗Ψ±b ψ±a ψ±b
Accordingly, “big psi” Ψ will denote the wave function, that is a vector of
an appropriate Hilbert space, whereas “small psi” ψ will stand for a physical
property of a physical system, the property that the wave function represents
on the Copenhagen interpretation. In the following we will reserve the term
“quantum state” for this physical property.3
(ii) Upon performing spin measurements on the particles their quantum state col-
lapses to eigenstates. For example, upon measuring the spin of the right particle
in direction b the singlet state ψs collapses either to ψ+b ψ−b or to ψ−b ψ+b.
Quantum probabilities (3)–(4) are interpreted as the probabilities of collapses
resulting in different collapsed states. More precisely:〈
Ψs, Â⊗ ÎΨs
〉
= p(ψ+a ψ−a|a ∧ ψs) (8)〈
Ψs, Î ⊗ B̂Ψs
〉
= p(ψ−b ψ+b|b ∧ ψs) (9)〈
Ψs, Â⊗ B̂Ψs
〉
= p(ψ+a ψ+b|a ∧ b ∧ ψs) (10)
where on the right hand side we have the conditional probabilities of post-
collapse quantum states, given the singlet state as a pre-collapse quantum state
and spin measurements performed in certain directions.
3This terminology is borrowed from (Maudlin, 2019, Ch. 3).
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(iii) If the quantum state of the two-particle system is of form ψ±a ψ±b (that is the
corresponding element of C2⊗C2 has the form of a tensor product Ψ±a⊗Ψ±b)
then the left particle is thought to be in state ψ±a and the right particle in state
ψ±b.
(iv) A particle is attributed “spin up (down) property” along a given direction a if
its quantum state is the corresponding eigenstate ψ+a (ψ−a). The operational
meaning of this is that if the particle’s state collapses to, say, ψ+a in mea-
surement a, then, at the same time, the measurement is assumed to yield the
corresponding outcome A.
(v) The quantum state ψ±u not only endows the particle with spin property in
direction u but also determines how the particle is disposed to react to spin
measurements in directions a 6= u, in the sense of predicting probabilities:





Since in general p(ψ+a|a ∧ ψ±u) 6= p(ψ+a|a ∧ ψ±v) for u 6= v, different quan-
tum states will yield different, incompatible predictions for the probabilities of
measurement outcomes. Therefore, different quantum states pertain to incom-
patible elements of reality. That is one can attribute only one quantum state to
an individual system at a time.4
The minimal interpretation (5)–(7) is an obvious consequence of collapse probabilities (8)–(10) in
conjunction with the operational meaning of collapsed states incorporated in (iii)–(iv). It must
be emphasized, however, that the formalism of QM equipped with the minimal interpretation
and the formalism of QM equipped with the Copenhagen interpretation are two different theories
of the world. As we now turn to discuss, the EPR argument only refers to QM à la the minimal
interpretation, whereas Einstein’s later arguments are essentially about QM à la the Copenhagen
interpretation.
3 The EPR argument implies the existence of new elements of
reality
Quantum probabilities (3)–(4) in conjunction with the minimal interpretation (5)–(7) yield the
following statistics observable in an EPR–Bohm experiment:













4The incompatibility of different quantum states is not to be conflated with the incompatibility of noncom-
muting observables. As we shall see in Section 5, while the latter plays no role in Einstein’s own incompleteness
arguments—as opposed to EPR’s original formulation—, the former does play a crucial role in Einstein’s con-
siderations. Note that the incompatibility of different quantum states is also an essential ingredient of Harrigan
and Spekkens’s (2010, p. 125) definition of a Ψ-ontic theory: “We call a hidden variable model Ψ-ontic if every
complete physical state or ontic state in the theory is consistent with only one pure quantum state.”
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When the measurements in the two wings are performed in the same direction (θ = 0), the
outcomes are perfectly anticorrelated:
p(A ∧B|a ∧ b ∧ Ps) = 0 (14)
That is, if the outcome in one wing is “spin up,” the outcome in the other wing is certain to be
“spin down,” and vice versa. Further, in an EPR–Bohm experiment, events in the two wings—the
tokens of a,A and b, B respectively—are spatially separated in each run. Consequently, assuming
relativistic causality, what happens in one wing cannot have influence on what happens in the
other wing. Then, in a given run of the experiment where parallel measurement directions have
been chosen, the premises of the RC fulfill: on the basis of performing spin measurement in the
right wing, without influencing the outcome in the left wing, we can be sure about the outcome
of spin measurement in the left wing (and vice versa). That is to say, “without in any way
disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the
value of a physical quantity.”5 If the RC is true, then “there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity.”
What does it take to be an element of physical reality corresponding to a physical quantity?
More precisely, how does an element of reality corresponding to a physical quantity relate to
those elements of reality that correspond to the measurement of this quantity, to the elements
of reality the minimal interpretation refers to? Here is Goldstein et al. (2011) pointing out what
the “element of physical reality” in the RC essentially does:
This criterion [the RC] simply reflects the fact that if the outcome of some experiment
isn’t pre-determined by some element of physical reality (i.e., if it is not a function
of something that was an element of physical reality before the experiment) then its
outcome involves some randomness and hence cannot be predicted with certainty.
(Goldstein et al., 2011, Sec. 10.3)
That is, an element of reality corresponding to a physical quantity is something that deter-
mines the outcome of measurement whenever the value of the quantity in question is measured.
Consequently, according to the RC, in each run of the EPR–Bohm experiment where parallel
measurement directions are chosen, the results of spin measurements in both6 wings must be
predetermined.
Notice that the above reflection of Goldstein et al. does not make any reference to the clause
of the RC “without in any way disturbing a system.” Indeed, if I am able to predict with certainty
the outcome of a measurement, even if by means of disturbing the system, then this outcome
must in some way be predetermined, otherwise, the point of Goldstein et al. being still valid, it
could not be predicted with certainty. Nevertheless, if the act of my “prediction” can influence
the outcome, then the element of reality that determines this outcome may well be the very act
5In this context, we need not distinguish between the value of a physical quantity and the outcome of a
measurement (cf. Healey, 2017, p. 101). In fact, as it will be clear from Section 6 where the RC will be proved to
be a special case of a much more general principle, the subject of our prediction in the formula of the RC can be
any physical event related to the system in question.
6On the face of it, the statement of the RC, as applied to the EPR–Bohm situation, is asymmetric with respect
to the outcomes in the two wings, in that we pick one of them to predict the other. But of course nothing hings
on which outcome is selected for which role, so the consequent of the RC, the fact that the outcome in question
is predetermined, must hold for both outcomes.
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of my “prediction.” That is, it may be the performance of measurement in the right wing that
determines the outcome in the left wing.7 If, however, the events in the two wings are spatially
separated, and thereby the act of prediction can no longer influence, and hence determine, the
predicted outcome, then this possibility is excluded. In this case the RC implies the presence
of new elements of reality that are not present according to the minimal interpretation of the
quantum mechanical description.8
The RC only guarantees the outcomes of spin measurements to be predetermined when the
measurements in the two wings are performed in the same direction. This is because for θ 6= 0
the probabilities (12)–(13) imply non-perfect correlation that does not allow for predicting with
certainty the outcome in one wing on the basis of the outcome in the other wing; and hence the
RC is not applicable. Moreover, even when the same measurement directions are chosen in the
two wings, the RC only predicts the presence of those elements of reality that correspond to spin
values in this chosen direction, but not in any other direction. However, the element of reality
idea has another aspect, not reflected in the above quote by Goldstein et al., ensuring that in
fact all spin outcomes in all directions must be predetermined in each run of the experiment.
Here is EPR considering this problem:
One could object to this conclusion [that the spin outcomes are predetermined in all
directions] on the grounds that our criterion of reality is not sufficiently restrictive.
Indeed, one would not arrive at our conclusion if one insisted that two or more
physical quantities can be regarded as simultaneous elements of reality only when
they can be simultaneously measured or predicted. On this point of view, since either
one or the other, but not both simultaneously, of the quantities [of the spin along
directions v and v′] can be predicted, they are not simultaneously real. This makes
the reality of [the spin of the second system along directions v and v′] depend upon
the process of measurement carried out on the first system, which does not disturb
the second system in any way. No reasonable definition of reality could be expected
to permit this. (Einstein et al., 1935, p. 780)
EPR refer to the spatial separation of events in the two wings. They point out that if the element
of reality that determines the outcome in one wing is, in each run of the experiment, assumed
to be localized in the same wing, then the presence of this element of reality cannot depend
on the direction in which we choose to measure in the other wing due to the causal separation
of the wings. Note that the absence of direct causal influence between the measurement choice
in one wing and the elements of reality in the other wing does not itself mean that there can
be no statistical dependence (even maximal correlation) between the two, brought about by a
“common cause.” This possibility is excluded not by locality considerations but by an independent
assumption, as is emphasized by Goldstein et al.:
Even though, in each run of the experiment, either the z-axis or the x-axis is chosen
7In connection with footnote 6, note that in this case the RC cannot be applied to infer that the right outcome,
used here as a means of “predicting” the left outcome, is also predetermined (in fact it can be fully random). For if
the right outcome is causally informed by the left measurement then the former cannot be reasonably regarded as a
prediction of the latter. See also the discussion in Section 6 on how the RC’s terms translate to a causal-statistical
language.
8Nor they are present according to the Copenhagen interpretation. This is because none of the spin outcomes
are predetermined in the singlet state.
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along which to perform the measurements, the elements of physical reality that exist
before the measurements cannot depend on choices that will be made later by the
experimenters! This, indeed, doesn’t follow from the assumption of locality itself but
it does follow from the so-called “no conspiracy” assumption which states, roughly
speaking, that the pair of particles prepared by the source does not “know” in advance
what experiments are going to be performed on them later. (Goldstein et al., 2011,
Sec. 10.3)
Of course not only it is assumed that the particles do not “know” what experiments are going to
be performed on them, but also that the experimenters do not “know” what elements of reality,
corresponding to the spin values of the particles along different directions, are present, and hence
their choice of the measurement setup does not depend on these elements of reality. It is assumed
that the presence of the elements of reality that predetermine the outcomes and the choices of
measurements are influenced by different factors, and therefore there exists no common factor
that could influence them both. The absence of common cause, in conjunction with the absence
of direct causal connection following from locality,9 together imply that there is nothing that
could serve to correlate the measurement choices and the elements of reality in question, and
hence their distributions over the runs of the experiment must be statistically independent. This
in turn will ensure EPR’s conclusion: there must exist elements of reality corresponding to the
spin values of the two particles in all directions in all runs of the experiment.10
9Some caution is in order here. Notice that the direction in which the spin outcome is guaranteed to be
determined, as a consequence of the RC, not only depends on the remote measurement choice but also on the
local one; for the presence of the element of reality corresponding to the left spin in direction v only follows
if the measurements in both of the two wings are performed along v. If the element of reality determining the
spin outcome on the left is assumed to be localized in the left wing (one can identify the “left wing” with the
past light cone of the left outcome), without more specific constraints on its localization, then it seems possible
that this element of reality is affected by the local measurement choice, through the process of measurement
performed in the left wing. Such an influence could break down the independence of the measurement choices
and the elements of reality in question. That the element of reality must be fixed before the local measurement
choice is made, excluding the possibility of such influence, as is suggested by Goldstein et al. above, is something
that is not implied by what has been said so far about the RC. We will see how this condition follows in Section 6
(footnote 23) where we discuss the deeper meaning of the RC.
10Indeed, let λ denote the element of reality that predetermines the outcomes of spin measurements along an
arbitrary given direction v in the two wings. The requirement that λ be statistically independent from the choices
of measurements just means
p(λ|c) = p(λ) (15)
where c denotes an arbitrary Boolean combination of measurement events a and b. Consider the subensemble
of runs where the measurement direction is set to be v in both wings (a = b = v). In this subensemble the
outcomes must be predetermined and the element of reality λ is certain to be present:
p(λ|a ∧ b) = 1 (16)
Now apply (15) to c = a ∧ b to obtain
p(λ) = 1 (17)
which is to say that the outcomes of spin measurements along the arbitrary direction v are predetermined in the
whole ensemble, that is in all runs of the experiment.
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4 Einstein’s later arguments imply that the wave function cannot
represent an element of reality pertaining to the individual
system
It must be emphasized that the EPR argument can be formulated merely in terms of the minimal
interpretation of QM. Therefore, the argument is independent of which interpretation11 of QM
one may favor. It is independent of any assumption expressed in terms of what may lie behind
the macroscopic measurement events.12
In contrast, EPR’s original formulation does employ a specific interpretation, namely the
Copenhagen interpretation. Thus, one may not be surprised that Einstein himself was dissatisfied
with the EPR text, saying “the main point was, so to speak, buried by the erudition” (Howard,
1985, p. 175). However, what Einstein took to be the main point of the EPR idea is rather
different, much simpler, then what we have outlined in the previous section, and is indeed
strongly related to the Copenhagen interpretation. The seed of this thought is there in the EPR
paper:
[...] as a consequence of two different measurements performed upon the first system,
the second system may be left in states with two different wave functions. On the
other hand, since at the time of measurement the two systems no longer interact, no
real change can take place in the second system in consequence of anything that may
be done to the first system. This is, of course, merely a statement of what is meant
by the absence of an interaction between the two systems. Thus, it is possible to
assign two different wave functions [...] to the same reality (the second system after
the interaction with the first). (Einstein et al., 1935, p. 779)
After the EPR paper Einstein formulated his worries about quantum mechanics in various dif-
ferent versions—among them in a letter to Schrödinger (dated June 19, 1935); in a letter to
Popper (dated September 11, 1935); in his 1936 “Physics and Reality” paper; and in his “Au-
tobiographical Notes” in 1948.13 All these considerations are variations and elaborations of the
same theme voiced in the above passage by EPR. What these reflections share is the adoption
of the quantum state collapse idea and, as Fine (1996, p. 5) stresses, the overall absence of any
reference to the RC that was so crucial to EPR. Here is Einstein’s 1936 argument:
Consider a mechanical system consisting of two partial systems A and B which in-
teract with each other only during a limited time. Let the Ψ function before their
interaction be given. Then the Schrödinger equation will furnish the Ψ function after
the interaction has taken place. Let us now determine the physical state of the par-
tial system A as completely as possible by measurements. Then quantum mechanics
allows us to determine the Ψ function of the partial system B from the measurements
made, and from the Ψ function of the total system. This determination, however,
11One exception is the many-worlds interpretation which circumvents the conclusion of EPR by refuting that
correlation (14) is real. Cf. (Maudlin, 2014, pp. 22–23).
12For example, such an assumption is the “separability” of quantum systems (Howard, 1985).
13For the various reconstructions of the EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments and many related topics
see e.g. (Howard, 1985), (Redhead, 1989, Ch. 3), (Hájek and Bub, 1992), (Fine, 1996, Ch. 3), (Norton, 2007),
and (Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010).
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gives a result which depends upon which of the physical quantities (observables) of A
have been measured (for instance, coordinates or momenta). Since there can be only
one physical state of B after the interaction which cannot reasonably be considered
to depend on the particular measurement we perform on the system A separated from
B it may be concluded that the Ψ function is not unambiguously coordinated to the
physical state. This coordination of several Ψ functions to the same physical state
of system B shows again that the Ψ function cannot be interpreted as a (complete)
description of a physical state of a single system. (Einstein, [1936] 1954, p. 317)
The essence of Einstein’s observation is that the quantum state collapse idea involved in the
Copenhagen interpretation is in contradiction with the physical/causal separation of the partial
systems (that is, with locality if causal separation is ensured by the spatial separation of the
two systems). For the sake of concreteness, let us reconstruct this argument as applied to
the EPR–Bohm scenario. On the Copenhagen interpretation, in every run of the EPR–Bohm
experiment where first the right wing measurement b is performed, the singlet state ψs collapses
to ψ+b ψ−b or to ψ−b ψ+b (clause (ii) in Section 2). According to the ontology of the Copenhagen
interpretation, in these runs, after the measurement on the right has been performed, the particle
on the left comes to be in state ψ±b; meaning that there is an element of reality localized in the
left wing that corresponds to the particle being in that state (clause (iii) in Section 2). Since
ψ±b is a function of b, this element of reality is dependent on which one of the measurement
directions has been selected in the other wing. How to interpret this functional dependence? It
is clear from Einstein’s words that what he has in mind is a sort of counterfactual dependence.
But if for any reason one wants to avoid reference to counterfactuals, there is no need to employ
these terms. For what functional dependence certainly implies is statistical correlation over the
runs of the experiment.14 Now, due to locality, this correlation of the element of reality in one
wing and the measurement choice made in the other wing, cannot be a consequence of direct
casual connection, since the two wings are spatially separated. The absence of direct casual
dependence, in itself, does not mean that the two events in question cannot be dependent in a
statistical sense, for there may exist a “common cause” that brings about correlation. However,
this possibility is again excluded by no-conspiracy: if the measurement choice b is assumed to be
autonomous, for example due to its being governed by a local random number generator, then b
cannot be affected by anything that influences the state of affairs in the left wing, including the
quantum state of the left particle. All in all, the element of reality the Copenhagen interpretation
assumes to exist in the left wing, ψ±b, cannot be brought about by any conceivable causal means.
Therefore, contrary to what the Copenhagen interpretation postulates, the wave function Ψ±b
cannot represent an element of reality ψ±b characterizing the physical state of the individual
particles. In other words, “the Ψ function cannot be interpreted as a [...] description of a
physical state of a single system.”
The conclusion of Einstein’s argument is that according to the Copenhagen interpretation
14The only way ψs can collapse to ψ±b ψ∓b is when the measurement choice in the right wing is b. This implies
correlation between the collapsed quantum state and the right wing measurement choice:
1
2
= p(ψ±b ψ∓b|b ∧ ψs) > p(ψ±b ψ∓b|¬b ∧ ψs) = 0 (18)
given that 0 < p(b), p (¬b) < 1, where ¬b denotes the “negation” of b, more precisely, the event of choosing an
arbitrary measurement direction in the right wing other than b.
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there ought to exist elements of reality, corresponding to the quantum state of the individual par-
ticles after state collapse, that cannot exist under the assumptions of locality and no-conspiracy.
5 The EPR argument is an incompleteness argument; Einstein’s
later arguments are not
The EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments are different in their premises and different
in their conclusions. More precisely, they are different to the extent that:
(a) The EPR argument can be formulated in terms of the minimal interpretation of QM,
whereas Einstein’s later arguments are essentially tied to the Copenhagen interpretation.
(b) The crucial ingredients of the EPR argument are locality, no-conspiracy, the perfect corre-
lation predicted by (the minimal interpretation of) QM, and the RC. In contrast, Einstein’s
later arguments make no reference to perfect correlation, neither to the RC; their essence is
to point to the tension between the quantum state collapse idea and locality (in conjunction
with no-conspiracy).
(c) The EPR argument implies the existence of elements of reality not described by QM, neither
on the the minimal interpretation, nor on the Copenhagen interpretation. Thus, QM, on
either of these interpretations, is incomplete. According to Einstein’s later argument, the
Copenhagen interpretation is committed to the existence of elements of reality that cannot
be out there in the world—under the assumptions of locality and no-conspiracy. Hence,
given these assumptions, the Copenhagen interpretation is unsound—as opposed to being
incomplete.
Despite these substantial differences the EPR and Einstein’s later arguments are often lumped
together in the literature: both of them are labeled as “incompleteness argument.” This termi-
nology also finds support in Einstein’s writings. Einstein saw his own reflections on the subject
as refinements of the EPR idea purporting to point to the fundamental incompleteness of QM.15
As remark (c) indicates this terminology is not quite apt nonetheless. Many commentators have
noticed (Hájek and Bub, 1992, p. 327; Howard, 1985, pp. 180–181; Lehner, 2014, pp. 334–336)
that the condition Einstein establishes in his 1936 argument (as well as in all of his similar
arguments)—“the Ψ function is not unambiguously coordinated to the physical state”—is not
identical with, but just the converse of the condition of incompleteness. (EPR (1935, p. 777)
define completeness as “every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the
physical theory.”) Lehner (2014) even introduces a terminology to mark this difference: he saves
“incompleteness” for EPR’s condition, while using “overcompleteness” for Einstein’s condition.
On the basis of this distinction, Lehrer (2014, p. 337) and Uffink (2020, p. 559) point out that
Einstein’s own reasoning provides a weaker argument for incompleteness than the EPR argu-
ment. However, this way of putting it still obscures the essential difference between Einstein’s
and EPR’s target. If a theory is “overcomplete” in the sense Einstein argues Copenhagen QM
must be, then it postulates more elements of reality then what there is in the world. Conse-
quently, some of the theory’s ontological claims are plainly false. Such a description already has
15But there is also indication that Einstein’s view about the relation of his later arguments and the completeness
question is subtler than this. See below in this section.
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a name: it is inadequate or unsound. Note that this latter terminology is in complete harmony
with the way (semantic) “completeness” and “soundness” is used in logic (though not for the
characterization of theories but of logical systems). “Completeness” is used when everything
that is true in the world (in the model) is also stated by the theory; “soundness” is used when
there is no statement of the theory that is not true in the world. In accord with this standard
terminology, Einstein’s later arguments are better be characterized as unsoundness arguments,
rather than incompleteness arguments.16
Since many may find this conclusion controversial, it will be useful to compare our discus-
sion with other reconstructions of Einstein’s later arguments in the literature. Howard (1985,
p. 181) offers an interesting reasoning about the way to see Einstein’s argument as pointing to
incompleteness:
‘Completeness’ surely requires of the Ψ-function that it describe all of the properties
of a system in a given real state, so that different real states must be described by dif-
ferent Ψ-functions (which is all that the [...] EPR completeness condition demands).
But why require, conversely, that different Ψ-functions always be correlated with dif-
ferent real states? Might there not be situations in which the differences between two
Ψ-functions (phase differences, for example) are inessential from the point of view of
the system whose real state they aim to describe? Einstein’s completeness condition
would, indeed, be too strong if it required that literally every difference between Ψ-
functions mirror a difference in the real state of the system in question; but such was
not Einstein’s intention. The kind of difference with which Einstein was concerned
is clear from his argument: ΨB and ΨB̄ [two different wave functions of system B
left behind after performing one of two alternative measurements on system A] differ
in the predictions they yield for the results of certain objective, local measurements
on system B. This is not an inessential difference, and Einstein was right in holding
that it is excluded by the demand for completeness, for the only way to account for
such a difference (assuming that both Ψ-functions provide ‘correct’ descriptions) is by
assuming that at least one of the two Ψ-functions, or perhaps each of them, gives an
incomplete description. [...] Two different Ψ-functions can give correct descriptions
of one and the same real state only if one of them, at least, tells less than the whole
truth about that real state.
Howard thinks there is a way to avoid concluding that the Copenhagen interpretation is unsound,
namely by assuming that it is incomplete. We believe, however, that there is no such a way out.
It is precisely because “ΨB and ΨB̄ differ in the predictions they yield for the results of certain
objective, local measurements on system B,” that the two wave functions are incompatible, and
so they cannot be assigned to the same real state by any correct theory of the world, even if it
only provides an incomplete description.17
16Note that drawing parallel between the problem of completeness in quantum mechanics and in logic is not
unprecedented in the literature. Howard and Giovanelli (2019) argue that the notion of completeness in
Einstein’s own arguments is analogous to, and in fact originates in, the concept of categoricity as it is used
in model theory.
17By analogy, suppose that a theory claims that a die is both fair and biased at the same time. Now, you will
not be able to avoid the conclusion that this theory is wrong by acknowledging that both “fair” and “biased” are
incomplete descriptions of the (rolling of the) die.
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The incompatibility of different quantum states—we formulated it as an ingredient of the
Copenhagen interpretation in clause (v) in Section 2—was in fact a crucial assumption in our
own reconstruction of Einstein’s argument too. For if one could coherently assign more than one
quantum state, the corresponding element of reality, to an individual system, then one could also
coherently imagine that the particle in the left wing in fact occupies one of the spin eigenstates
for every spatial direction at the same time. In other words, one could imagine that the physical
state of the left particle, after the right wing measurement has been carried out, simultaneously
incorporates ψ+v or ψ−v for all v, not only the one that results after collapsing ψs by the
measurement b actually performed. Then the physical state of the particle, incorporating all
these ψ±v-s as partial descriptions, in fact would not be dependent on the measurement choice
in the other wing—the state collapse would not bring about a correlation between the physical
state of the left particle and the performance of the right wing measurement.18 Thus, one would
have no contradiction with the causal separation of the two wings ensured by locality and no-
conspiracy in Einstein’s argument. So if different quantum states were compatible elements
of reality, then giving up seeing them as complete descriptions would indeed provide a way
out from concluding that they must be incorrect descriptions—just as Howard suggests. But,
again, because different quantum states yield incompatible probability predictions, they cannot
simultaneously provide correct descriptions, even if each of them provides only an incomplete
description.19 Hence, incompleteness is not an antidote to the inadequacy of the Copenhagen
interpretation.
Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) recently argued for a thesis that resonates with our conclusion.
Here is how they summarize their result:
What is not typically recognized, and which we show explicitly here, is that the lat-
ter argument was actually strong enough to also rule out locality for Ψ-ontic hidden
variable theories. In other words, Einstein showed that not only is locality incon-
sistent with Ψ being a complete description of reality, it is also inconsistent with Ψ
being ontic, that is, inconsistent with the notion that Ψ represents reality even in an
incomplete sense. Einstein thus provided an argument for the epistemic character of
Ψ based on locality. (Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010, pp. 126–127)
Indeed, since the Copenhagen interpretation is Ψ-ontic (that is it takes Ψ to represent an element
of reality pertaining to the individual system), what Einstein must have achieved, based on the
locality assumption, is proving it unsound, rather than incomplete. However, Harrigan and
Spekkens suggest that what Einstein actually showed is stronger than incompleteness, hence his
argument still entails incompleteness. This suggestion is made explicit on p. 133 (Lemma 6) where
they formulate the claim that the non-ontic (“epistemic”) character of Ψ entails its incompleteness.
Notice, however, the important difference between the notion that Ψ, whether on an ontic or
epistemic interpretation, alone provides an incomplete description of reality, and the notion that
the theory which features Ψ, QM under a certain interpretation, as a whole is incomplete. Clearly,
Harrigan and Spekkens’s notion of “Ψ-incompleteness” (Definition 2–3, p. 131) corresponds to
18The right hand side of (18) would no longer be forced to equal to 0.
19Notice the difference here between the EPR and Einstein’s arguments. EPR infer, through the RC, that
the particles posses spin properties in all directions. By contrast, we are not entitled to ascribe to the particles,
through state collapse, all quantum states ψ+v or ψ−v for all directions v. This is because while spin properties
in different directions are logically compatible, quantum states are not.
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the first conception, while EPR’s incompleteness refers to a theory and hence it corresponds
to the second one. The non-ontic character of Ψ evidently implies Ψ-incompleteness, for if
Ψ doesn’t represent an element of reality (pertaining to the individual system) at all, then, a
fortiori, it cannot represent all elements of reality (pertaining to the individual system) either—as
completeness would require. But Ψ-incompleteness is entirely silent about whether the theory
which features Ψ, as a whole, is complete or not. A case in point is the minimal interpretation
of QM. QM à la the minimal interpretation, as we defined it in Section 2, is certainly a non-
Ψ-ontic theory, and hence it is also Ψ-incomplete. But the mere fact of this doesn’t entail that
QM à la the minimal interpretation must be an incomplete theory.20 Indeed, to show that, we
need the EPR argument. Thus, while Harrigan and Spekkens are right to state that Einstein’s
argument rules out the Ψ-complete interpretations of QM, this doesn’t make Einstein’s argument
an incompleteness argument, in the sense of EPR’s condition of completeness. For, there is no
particular account of reality that is shown to be incomplete by Einstein’s argument. What the
argument shows is that the Ψ-ontic account of quantum phenomena provided by the Copenhagen
interpretation of QM is unsound.
Note, again, the sense in which Einstein’s conclusion entails Ψ-incompleteness: if Ψ cannot
be interpreted as the description of the physical state of a single system, then it certainly cannot
provide a complete description of such a state. This is just what Einstein seems to imply, in the
last quoted sentence of his 1936 argument above, by putting the term “complete” in parenthesis.
The almost off-hand manner in which Einstein mentions completeness seems to be an indication
that the focus of his reasoning is not so much the incompleteness of the wave function, but
the very fact that it cannot be regarded as a description of individual systems at all. Einstein
seems to have been fully aware of the distinction between Ψ-incompleteness, as it is established
by his own argument, and the notion that quantum theory is incomplete, as it is defined and
defended it in the EPR paper. A clear evidence of this is the way he actually relates his finding
about the non-ontic character of the wave function to the question of completeness in a later
part of the 1936 paper—a way which is significantly different from the off-handed reference to
Ψ-incompleteness in the quoted sentence. To see this relation, let us follow the line of his 1936
reasoning. To the quoted passage of the 1936 paper Einstein immediately adds: “Here also
the coordination of the Ψ function to an ensemble of systems eliminates every difficulty. A
measurement on A, for example, thus involves a transition to a narrower ensemble of systems.
The latter (hence also its Ψ function) depends upon the point of view according to which this
reduction of the ensemble of systems is carried out.” (Einstein, [1936] 1954, p. 317) Einstein
suggests that the tension of locality and wave function collapse is resolvable by abandoning the
Copenhagen interpretation and adopting what might be called an ensemble interpretation of the
wave function. It is not completely clear what exactly Einstein’s ensemble interpretation might
have been (cf. Fine, 1996, Ch. 4), but what is certainly involved in it is the insistence that the
wave function, rather than pertaining to the ontology of the single system, merely serves as an
encryption of statistical features of an ensemble of systems. On the other hand, while adopting
an ensemble interpretation naturally resolves the problem raised by his later arguments, Einstein
did not believe that a merely statistical account of quantum phenomena could be regarded as a
20Recall that the elements of reality posited by the minimal interpretation of QM are macroscopic measure-
ment events such as preparation and measurement procedures and outcomes of measurements. There do exist
approaches to quantum theory holding that QM expressed in these macroscopic terms should be regarded as
complete. An example of such an approach is the so-called operational QM advocated by (Werner, 2014).
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complete description. In his words:
What happens to the single system remains, it is true, entirely unclarified by this
mode of consideration; this enigmatic happening is entirely eliminated from the rep-
resentation by the statistical manner of consideration.
But now I ask: Is there really any physicist who believes that we shall never
get any inside view of these important alterations in the single systems, in their
structure and their causal connections, and this regardless of the fact that these single
happenings have been brought so close to us, thanks to the marvelous inventions of
the Wilson chamber and the Geiger counter? To believe this is logically possible
without contradiction; but, it is so very contrary to my scientific instinct that I
cannot forego the search for a more complete conception. (Einstein, [1936] 1954,
p. 318)
Thus, it is not Einstein’s later arguments themselves, directed against the Copenhagen interpre-
tation, that imply incompleteness (in EPR’s sense of the term); rather it is the natural response to
these arguments, the adoption of an ensemble interpretation, that suggests, rather than implies,
the EPR-incompleteness of QM (à la an ensemble interpretation).
To conclude: Einstein’s later arguments are not incompleteness arguments. It is only the
EPR argument that implies the incompleteness of QM. The EPR argument points to a particular
type of element of reality that is not described by QM, but which, according to the premises of
the argument, should nonetheless be out there in the physical world. What makes it possible
to infer the existence of elements of reality out there in the world? It is the RC that renders it
possible, without which no new elements of reality are inferred. The RC is thus not eliminable
from the incompleteness argument(s)—at least from the one(s) we have so far laid out. This
suggest that it must have a substantial content. Now we turn to the question of the precise
meaning of this principle.
6 The Reality Criterion is a special case of the Common Cause
Principle
Consider again how Goldstein et al. (2011) formulates the essence of the RC:
This criterion simply reflects the fact that if the outcome of some experiment isn’t
pre-determined by some element of physical reality [...] then its outcome involves
some randomness and hence cannot be predicted with certainty. (Goldstein et al.,
2011, Sec. 10.3)
What, exactly, is the source of the impossibility that the RC associates with the prediction
of a random outcome? Suppose you flip a coin a thousand times. Suppose that your friend,
every time you flip the coin, makes a guess about the result, before it is revealed. Imagine that
she always gets it right: whenever she predicts Heads, the coin comes up Heads, whenever she
predicts Tails, the coin comes up Tails. Such a coincidence would cry out for an explanation.
Either your friend’s prediction must somehow influence the outcome, for example by you altering
the coin’s position before revealing it so as to match her guess; or her prediction must, in some
way, be informed by the flip of the coin, for example by her employing a computer that detects
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the mechanical initial data of the coin flip and calculates the outcome on the basis of the laws
of mechanics. In either case, the outcome must be predetermined—by your friend’s guess or
by the initial conditions of the coin flip—, otherwise the perfect match of the guesses with the
outcomes would be a magical coincidence, a correlation without causal explanation. Thus, the
RC, we believe, is nothing but the expression of the intuition that correlations—in particular,
the correlation between the act of predicting something on the one hand and the predicted
phenomena on the other—require explanation in terms of causal connections. That is, the RC
is just a special case of the Common Cause Principle (CCP). This claim is what we are going to
expand on and argue for in the following.
To make this claim precise, we need to have a translation between the RC’s terms and the
language of the CCP. First, let us make explicit the conceptual framework in which both these
principles will be formulated. Consider the statistical ensemble of the runs of an experiment
performed repeatedly for a large number of times. Each run is a token event that may instantiate
certain event types. For example, let a denote the event type of performing a given measurement
and let A denote the event type of one of its outcome occurring. Consider the statistics of
the different event types over the ensemble of runs. Let p(a), p(A), p(A|a), etc. denote the
corresponding probabilities. In each individual run the token events can be causally related. Let
a→ A denote that the tokens of a have, at least in some runs of the experiment, causal influence
on the tokens of A (9 will denote the absence of casual influence). We will not be concerned
here about the meaning of this causal relation. We will see, however, that both the RC’s and
the CCP’s statements presuppose that we can meaningfully talk about such a relation.
Let us now try to unpack the RC’s statement in the above terms. What do we mean by
“predicting with certainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity”?
Let a denote the measurement of the quantity in question and A be the outcome event corre-
sponding to the quantity having a certain value. The act of predicting this quantity is an event
(in the coin example, your friend uttering, say, “Heads”). Let B denote this event: predicting
that the quantity in question has a value pertaining to outcome A. The prediction is certain if
whenever B happens then, given that a is performed, the measurement results in outcome A.
That is:
p(A|a ∧B) = 1 (19)
Event B only qualifies as a prediction if B happens before outcome A is revealed; more precisely,
if A doesn’t causally precede B, meaning that the act of prediction is not influenced by the
outcome to be predicted. (If your friend sees the outcome of the coin flip before “predicting”
it, then it is no longer a prediction. In other words, B cannot be such a retrodiction where the
retrodicted event A influences its retrospective prediction B.) In symbols:
A9 B (20)
To this, the clause “without in any way disturbing a system” adds that, reversely, nor does the
act of prediction influence the measurement outcome to be predicted. That is:
B 9 A (21)
We have already seen what the consequent of the RC—“there exists an element of physical
reality corresponding to this physical quantity”—is supposed to mean. What it means, as is
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clear from the explication of Goldstein et al. (2011), is that the outcome of the measurement
in question is predetermined. In other words, there exists an event α determining that outcome
A will occur upon performing measurement a. Now, what exactly do we mean by “determine”?
What we want to express is that α is a “sufficient cause” of A, given that a is performed. In
terms of our framework, this involves the following ingredients. First,
α→ A (22)
that is “determining” is a causal relation.21 Second,
p(A|a ∧ α) = 1 (23)
that is, whenever the “sufficient cause” α occurs, then the effect A also occurs, given some
background conditions provided here by the performance of a. Third, the correlation (23) of
the “cause” and the “effect” must be a consequence of their causal connection (22), and not be
brought about by any other causal means. Such an alternative causal means could in principle be
a common causal connection of α and A (that may exists besides their direct causal connection).
So when we say that α determines A, we will assume that there exists no event C such that both
C → A and C → α hold. For notational convenience, we introduce α ; A for α → A in the
absence of common causal connection between α and A.22
Putting all this together, here is what the RC states:
Reality Criterion Suppose that A is an outcome of measurement a. Assume that there is an
event B such that
A9 B andB 9 A (24)
p(A|a ∧B) = 1 (25)
Then there exists a further event α such that
α; A (26)
p(A|a ∧ α) = 1 (27)
Now, let’s go over to the Common Cause Principle. In its briefest formulation, the CCP
asserts that there is no correlation without causal explanation. More precisely, whenever we
observe correlation in the world, this must be either due to a direct causal connection between
21We do not want to claim that interpreting determination as a causal relation is the only possibility. In the
next section we will discuss an alternative interpretation, one formulated in nomological terms.
22To illustrate the significance of this third condition, consider the following example. Two light bulbs and a
switch are connected in a series circuit. When the switch is closed, both lights are on; when the switch is open,
both lights are off. Since the operation of the bulbs are perfectly correlated, the state of one bulb “determines”
the state of the other bulb in a statistical sense. Further, as the light bulbs are connected in series, the first bulb
in the circuit has direct causal influence on the operation of the second one through influencing the charges that
move towards the second bulb. (For example, were the first bulb not present, the second bulb would glow slightly
brighter.) So, conditions analogous to (22) and (23) are satisfied by the states of the two light bulbs. But it is
certainly not the state of one bulb that causally determines whether the other bulb is on or off; rather it is a
common cause, the switch, that predetermines whether both lights are on or off.
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the correlated events, or due to a third event, a common cause, that influences both of them. The
principle was first formulated by Reichenbach (1956) who characterized the common cause as a
screener-off. Since its first formulation many important improvements have been made on the
CCP’s mathematical expression (Hofer-Szabó et al., 2013). For the sake of simplicity, here we
provide a formulation essentially identical to Reichenbach’s original one, with slight adjustments
to the present framework:
Let A and B denote two arbitrary events such that
A9 B andB 9 A (28)
p(A ∧B) 6= p(A)p(B) (29)
Then there exists an event C, a “common cause,” such that
C,¬C ; A,B (30)
p(A ∧B|C) = p(A|C)p(B|C) (31)
p(A ∧B|¬C) = p(A|¬C)p(B|¬C) (32)
A special case of this general principle is when A is an outcome of a measurement a, and
p(·) = p(·|a); that is, we consider a statistical subensemble of experimental runs where a is
always performed. This leads to the particular formulation of the CCP that we will employ:
Common Cause Principle Suppose that A is an outcome of measurement a. Assume that
there is an event B such that
A9 B andB 9 A (33)
p(A ∧B|a) 6= p(A|a)p(B|a) (34)
Then there exists a further event C such that
C,¬C ; A,B (35)
p(A ∧B|a ∧ C) = p(A|a ∧ C)p(B|a ∧ C) (36)
p(A ∧B|a ∧ ¬C) = p(A|a ∧ ¬C)p(B|a ∧ ¬C) (37)
Proposition 1. The Reality Criterion follows from the Common Cause Principle.
Proof. Assuming that p(A|a) 6= 1, (25) obviously implies (34). Thus, since (24) is just identical
with (33), the RC’s antecedent implies the CCP’s antecedent. We show that given the RC’s
antecedent, either C or ¬C in the CCP’s consequent satisfies the conditions on α in the RC’s
consequent. (26) trivially follows from (35) both for α = C and α = ¬C; hence we focus on
condition (27).
(25) can be rewritten as p(B|a) = p(A∧B|a). Applying this and the law of total probability
for expressing p(A∧B|a) in terms of p(A∧B|a∧C) and p(A∧B|a∧¬C), while making use of
(36)–(37), we receive
p(B|a) = p(A|a ∧ C)p(B|a ∧ C)p(C|a) + p(A|a ∧ ¬C)p(B|a ∧ ¬C)p(¬C|a) (38)
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On the other hand, the law of total probability also implies
p(B|a) = p(B|a ∧ C)p(C|a) + p(B|a ∧ ¬C)p(¬C|a) (39)
Comparing the coefficients of p(C|a) and p(¬C|a) in the two expressions for p(B|a), we have the
following options:
• If p(B|a ∧ C) 6= 0, the equality of the coefficients of p(C|a) in (38) vs. (39) implies that
p(A|a ∧ C) = 1.
• If p(B|a ∧ C) = 0 then p(B|a ∧ ¬C) 6= 0, otherwise p(B|a) could not be recovered in (39)
(assuming that p(B|a) 6= 0). In that case, the equality of the coefficients of p(¬C|a) in
(38) vs. (39) implies that p(A|a ∧ ¬C) = 1.
Thus, either α = C or α = ¬C satisfies (27). Therefore, the existence of such an α, under the
conditions in the RC’s antecedent, follows from the CCP’s requirement.
The basic idea behind the proved entailment is simple. Predicting with certainty the out-
come of a measurement essentially means that there is perfect correlation between the result of
prediction and the predicted outcome. As is well known (Hofer-Szabó et al., 2013, p. 15, Propo-
sition 2.7), perfect correlation can only be explained, in accord with the CCP’s requirement, by
a deterministic common cause. Hence, the outcome must be predetermined.23
Proposition 1 can easily be extended to more general formulations of the RC’s and CCP’s
requirements: one can have more than one pair of correlated events (for instance, due to the
predicted measurement having more than one outcome); one can apply the notion of a common
cause system instead of one single common cause (Hofer-Szabó et al., 2013, Sec. 7), etc.24 The
main message of the result, however, is independent of these technical details. The point, we
believe, is already there in the example at the beginning of this section: the basic idea behind the
RC’s requirement is that a successful prediction cannot be accidental, it must be brought about
by causal connection. If the prediction is certain, and if the act of prediction does not disturb
the predicted phenomenon, this causal connection must take the form of predetermination by a
common cause.
23Not only the predicted outcome but also the result of prediction must therefore be predetermined by the
element of reality serving as a common cause of the two. In the EPR–Bohm context this means that the element
of reality in question must be localized within the intersection of the past light cones of the measurement outcomes
in the two wings. This is the explanation why the element of reality, implied by the RC to determine the outcome
in one wing, must be fixed before (or at least not be causally influenced by) the measurement choices in both
wings—not only in the distant one but also in the local one. Indeed, given that the events of measurement choices
a and b fall outside of the past light cones of the corresponding remote outcomes B and A, respectively (which is
a fact of actual experimental design; see e.g. (Redhead, 1987, p. 111)), the common cause of the outcomes cannot
be influenced by either of the measurement choices. See the problem raised in footnote 9.
24Note that Proposition 1 can also be extended to the slightly more general formulation of the RC, given by
Goldstein et al. (2011), in which the “without in any way disturbing a system” clause is absent. This amounts to
leaving out B 9 A from (24) in the RC’s antecedent. The RC thus construed can easily be shown to follow from
the following version of the CCP directly capturing the idea that any correlation must be brought about either
by direct causal link or by common causal connection:
Suppose that A is an outcome of measurement a. Assume that there is an event B such that p(A ∧ B|a) 6=
p(A|a)p(B|a). Then A; B, or B ; A, or there exists a further event C satisfying (35)–(37).
Indeed, applying this statement to the case stipulated by the RC’s antecedent without B 9 A, what follows is
that the predicted outcome must be predetermined either by the act of prediction itself or by a common cause of
the outcome and the result of prediction.
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7 The Reality Criterion is not analytic
It must be emphasized that even though both B and α are characterized by the same statistical
condition (25) and (27) in the RC’s formula above—expressing that both B and α “determine”
the predicted measurement outcome A in a statistical sense—, they are different events as they
bear different, incompatible causal relations—(24) vs. (26)—to A. Thus, what the RC implies
to exist, the element of reality predetermining the predicted outcome, is not something that
logically/analytically follows from its antecedent, the possibility of predicting the outcome with
certainty, without disturbing the measurement. Therefore the RC is not an analytic truth.
With this remark in mind it will be instructive to consider Tim Maudlin’s (2014) claim to the
contrary. Here is the crucial passage from his argument to the effect that the RC is an analytic
truth:
[...] suppose, as the criterion demands, that I can without in any way disturbing a
system predict with certainty the value of a physical quantity (for example, predict
with certainty how the system will react in some experiment). Then, first, there
must be some physical fact about the system that determines it will act that way.
That is just to say that the physical behavior of a system depends on its physical
state: if a system is certain to do something physical, then something in its physical
state entails that it will do it. So determining that the system is certain to behave in
some way is determining that some such physical state (element of reality) obtains.
(Maudlin, 2014, p. 7)
The point where this reasoning goes off course, we believe, is the conflation of two distinct notions
of “determination”: first, the notion that “a system is certain to do something” in the sense that
we can predict with certainty how the system will behave (without disturbing it), and second,
the notion that there is “something in its physical state entailing that it will do it” in the sense
of there existing a sufficient cause predetermining its behavior. The difference here is precisely
what corresponds to the distinction between B and α in our formulation of the RC: prediction
with certainty, without disturbance, means perfect correlation in the absence of direct causal
connection, while causal determination means perfect correlation on account of direct causal
connection. Once this crucial distinction is blurred, any statement about the relation of these
two notions may come out as analytic.
Some authors have already pointed out this slip in Maudlin’s argument (Lewis, 2019; Glick
and Boge, 2019). What our analysis adds to this discussion is that we are now in a position to
explicitly specify where the RC’s factual content actually comes from—something those authors
were contemplating. Consider Lewis’s observation:
I doubt that Einstein’s criterion of reality is really analytic [...] It seems perfectly
conceivable that an event could be predicted with certainty even when there is noth-
ing physical that brings that event about. [...] Indeed, Maudlin is perfectly sanguine
about fundamentally probabilistic laws (e.g. in spontaneous collapse theories), ac-
cording to which there is in general no physical reason why this result is obtained (as
opposed to that result) when the probabilities differ from zero and one. Why should
things be different when the probabilities are zero and one? (Lewis, 2019, pp. 38–39)
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The answer to this is now simple and clean: the reason why probability-1 predictions are distin-
guished is because those predictions mean perfect correlation between the act of prediction and
the predicted outcome, and a perfect correlation can only be explained, in accord with the CCP’s
requirement, by a deterministic common cause; hence the outcome must be predetermined. By
contrast, prediction with an intermediate probability value entails non-perfect correlation that,
in line with the CCP, can be accounted for by a stochastic common cause which increases the
probability of the outcome in question but does not determine it. Hence, in that case, we are
not entitled to infer the existence of an element of reality corresponding to that outcome.
A similar challenge to Maudlin’s claim is raised by Glick and Boge:
One could be justifiably certain about a future event in an indeterministic universe,
in which case there would be no prior determinant of the event [...] Suppose, for
instance, that there is an oracle who has direct access to a future measurement event,
the outcome of which is the result of a random, indeterministic process. One could
be justifiably certain to find [the measurement outcome] without the presence of a
feature of the system now that determines the outcome of this future measurement.
(Glick and Boge, 2019, pp. 4–5)
Indeed, the meanings of the terms “certain to find” or “determine” do not themselves make the
existence of such an oracle impossible, as Maudlin’s analyticity claim would suggest. Rather, it
is robust principles about the causal structure of the world to which this possibility contradicts:
if the oracle’s prediction is indeed certain in the sense that she always gets it right, and at the
same time the predicted outcome is indeed a result of an indeterministic process, then the perfect
correlation of the two can only be either a consequence of some sort of retrocausal connection
(contradicting that causes precede effects)25 or a magical coincendence without any sort of causal
explanation (contradicting the CCP).
Our argument against Maudlin’s analyticity claim is based on a particular translation of the
RC’s terms to a causal-statistical language. One can give a different interpretation to those
terms, however, that does seem to support Maudlin’s claim. Notice that in the EPR–Bohm
case the perfect correlation of spin outcomes is predicted by a theory, quantum mechanics.
One might thus relate the notions of prediction and determination to that of a theory and
its laws: “predicting with certainty the value of a physical quantity” means that given certain
initial/boundary conditions (in the EPR–Bohm case, the outcome of the local spin measurement),
the equations of the physical theory at hand imply that the quantity in question has a certain
value. On the other hand, the fact that this value is predetermined, as opposed to springing into
existence by chance, means that the laws of physics, given certain initial/boundary conditions,
entail this value. Now, if the laws of physics are just the equations of the physical theory at
hand, then clearly the notions of “prediction with certainty” and “determination” coincide and
the RC translates to an analytic truth.
The analyticity claim thus construed is not necessarily in contradiction with seeing the RC
as a special case of the CCP. Indeed, in an earlier writing Maudlin seems to suggest, in line with
the above interpretation of the RC, that the CCP is also analytic:
25Note that in this case the oracle’s action doesn’t actually qualify as a prediction in our causal terminology
for (20) doesn’t hold.
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Our first condition [the screening-off condition for conditionalizing on common causes,
(36)–(37)] just states that if we have taken into account every event which could serve
to correlate A and B by causally influencing them both, then there should be no fur-
ther predictable correlation between them. This condition is sometimes characterized
as a demand for causal explanation for correlations, although that characterization
is not quite apt. The screening-off condition allows that there be accidental corre-
lations, due to pure chance, but requires that no such correlations be predicted by
a theory. This is nearly tautologous – if a theory predicts a correlation, then that
correlation cannot, according to the theory, be accidental. A nomic correlation is
indicative of a causal connection – immediate or mediate – between the events, and
is accounted for either by a direct causal link between them, or by a common cause
of both. (Maudlin, 2011, p. 82)
The added footnote is more explicit:
[...] this “principle” [the CCP] is not really a demand for a particular type of “causal”
explanation, but rather a consequence of the notion of a cause. That is, such reli-
able correlations will validate certain counterfactual claims, and those counterfactual
claims imply that there is some causal connection. (Maudlin, 2011, p. 125)
That is to say: (1) Only nomic correlations—ones entailed by laws of nature—have to be brought
about by causal connection, for there may exist accidental correlations. (2) Nomic correlations,
on the other hand, imply counterfactual dependence, and this counterfactual dependence is what
a causal connection actually consists in (on the counterfactual analysis of causation). Therefore,
nomic correlations, by the very meaning of “causal connection,” always have a “causal explana-
tion.”
This is not the place to enter into the longstanding discussion on laws of nature, causation
and their relation to scientific explanation and theories. But to defend our own view on the RC,
let us close this section by raising a few difficulties that Maudlin’s interpretation of the RC and
the CCP may encounter in the particular case of the EPR problem:
• The EPR argument, as we formulated it in Section 3, can be rephrased without ever men-
tioning quantum theory or the laws of QM. This is because the EPR argument only refers
to the minimal interpretation of QM, and hence it can be couched merely in terms of what
quantum theory entails about macroscopic, observable phenomena. Indeed, imagine that
someone who has never heard of QM is asked to go in the lab and register the statistics in an
EPR–Bohm-type experiment. Merely on the basis of the observed statistics of macroscopic
measurement events she will be able to formulate the EPR argument and conclude that
those measurement outcomes must be predetermined. Therefore, anything that figures in
that argument must be expressible independently from the theoretical account and laws
thought to govern the observable phenomena. In particular, this must be true for the RC
and the CCP.
• No doubt, counterfactual dependence is analytically tied to nomic correlation, for both
of them are analytically related to laws of nature (posited by a theory). However, not
every counterfactual dependency is automatically interpretable as causal connection, as
the “causal explanation” of the nomic correlation in question. A case in point is Einstein’s
23
1936 argument.26 The essence of the argument, as we reconstructed it in Section 4, is
this. The laws of QM à la the Copenhagen interpretation—quantum state collapse—entail
correlation between the choice of measurement in one wing and the quantum state of
the particle in the other wing. The CCP requires casual explanation. Due to locality,
there cannot be direct casual connection. Due to no-conspiracy, there cannot be common
causal connection either. Thus, we have an example of a nomic correlation, entailed by
the laws of Copenhagen QM, without causal explanation. That is, even though the laws of
Copenhagen QM entail counterfactual dependence between the choice of measurement in
one wing and the quantum state of the particle in the other wing,27 this dependency cannot
be interpreted as causal connection because it doesn’t satisfy certain desiderata that we
want (Einstein certainly wanted) to require from causal connection on the basis of further
causal principles such as locality and no-conspiracy. Notice that it is not relevant whether
those causal principles are eventually maintainable or not (many believe that the main
massage of the EPR–Bell problem is that locality is not a maintainable physical principle).
Nor it is important whether the laws posited by the theory in question—the laws of QM
à la the Copenhagen interpretation—are actually true in the world (the conclusion of
Einstein’s argument is that they are not). The point is that the mere conceivability of an
argument like Einstein’s implies that it is possible to dispute whether the counterfactual
dependency analytically tied to a nomic correlation really qualifies as causal connection;
which means that there cannot be analytic connection between a nomic correlation and its
causal explanation.
• Even if accepted that nomic correlations automatically entail causal connections in terms
of which we can explain those correlations, the claim that non-nomic correlations don’t
require such an explanation is particularly problematic. In fact, in most cases where we
apply the CCP we consider events that are not nomically related. No-conspiracy is a perfect
example. Why to demand that there be no correlation between the measurement choices
and the properties of the system being measured, in an EPR–Bohm experiment? This
is because we believe those two things are causally independent—no direct, no common
causal connection between them (on the counterfactual analysis of causation, or on any
other account one may like). However, if Maudlin’s claim were correct, there could always
be accidental correlation, due to pure chance, between causally/nomically unrelated events,
so there would be no reason to suppose that those two causally independent factors—the
choices of measurements and the system’s properties—are uncorrelated. The only reason to
suppose that comes from the CCP regarded as a synthetic principle that excludes precisely
the sort of thing Maudlin thinks possible: accidental correlations, brought about by pure
chance, not by causal connection.
26For further examples and arguments see e.g. (Lange, 2016).
27In case of stochastic laws, such as the laws of Copenhagen QM, what we may mean by counterfactual depen-




Let us now summarize the main points of our analysis from a somewhat different angle. Here
is the essence of the EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments against QM, adapted to the
framework of an EPR–Bohm experiment:
• EPR argument : In accord with the CCP, causal explanation for perfect correlations of
spin outcomes respecting locality and no-conspiracy requires preexisting spin values in all
directions.
• Einstein’s later arguments: Quantum state collapse entails correlation between the choice of
measurement in one wing and the quantum state of the particle in the other wing. The CCP
requires casual explanation. Due to locality, there cannot be direct casual connection; due
to no-conspiracy, there cannot be common causal connection either. Hence, the correlation
entailed by the laws of Copenhagen QM has no causal explanation.
Given the CCP, locality, no-conspiracy, and the perfect correlations predicted by QM (à la the
minimal interpretation), the EPR argument implies the existence of elements of reality—the
preexisting spin values—that are not described by QM (on either of the two interpretations we
considered). Hence, according the EPR argument, QM is incomplete. By contrast, Einstein’s
later argument shows that QM à la the Copenhagen interpretation delivers a correlation that
contradicts to the CCP, locality and no-conspiracy taken together. Hence, given the latter as
premises, Einstein’s argument implies that Copenhagen QM is unsound.
From the perspective of the CCP, the structure of the two arguments is similar. The role
of QM in both arguments is delivering a set of correlations we seek to explain in accord with
the CCP’s requirement. Locality and no-conspiracy are causal principles serve to constrain the
circle of possible explanations. For the perfect correlation of spin outcomes the only possible
explanation is that the spin values are predetermined in all directions. For the correlation
of measurement settings and quantum states there exists no conceivable explanation that is
consistent with those casual principles.
Notice, however, that there is an important difference in what the CCP is meant to require
in the two cases. Einstein’s later argument only makes use of a weak version of the CCP
demanding that there be no correlation without some sort of causal connection. This is sufficient
for Einstein’s argument to work since locality and no-conspiracy together ensure that there cannot
be any kind of casual connection between the measurement choice in one wing and the quantum
state of the particle in the other wing (hence the correlation of the two cannot possible have any
sort of causal explanation). But the EPR argument employs much more of the CCP than this.
Its essential ingredient is the requirement that perfect correlation, in the absence of direct causal
connection, can only be explained by a deterministic common cause—something that Einstein’s
argument never invokes.28 It is this crucial consequence of the CCP, without which there is no
incompleteness argument, that we came to call the Criterion of Reality after EPR.
Since its very first formulation, the issue of exactly what presuppositions go into Bell’s no-go
theorem has been subject to intense debate. Because the EPR argument was part of Bell’s 1964
reasoning, the same question has been asked with regard to the presuppositions of the EPR
28That is, the weaker version of the CCP only refers to (33)–(35), while the stronger version essentially makes
use of (36)–(37), the fact that the common cause is characterized as a screener-off.
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argument itself. In particular, it has been suggested, and intensely discussed recently, that some
sort of “realism” is among the assumptions of the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem.29 What
advocates of such a view mean by realism varies from the general epistemological doctrine of
scientific/metaphysical realism to more specific notions such as counterfactual definiteness or
hidden variables. This is not the place to enter into this discussion. However, we would like
to point out one important consequence of our thesis for this debate: as long as the “realism”
assumption is meant to be related with the Reality Criterion, as EPR formulated it, this as-
sumption is just tantamount to the Principle of the Common Cause. In other words, those who
want to get around Bell’s theorem by giving up “realism,” as encapsulated in the RC, those in
fact deny a metaphysical principle that relates statistical regularities with the underlying casual
structure of the world. This principle, as we argued, is synthetic and hence it can be subject to
reevaluation.30 But it has to do with realism only to the extent to which talk about causation
and causally–statistically related events presupposes realism.
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